The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated the nuclear power plant aging research (NPAR) program about 6 years ago to gather information about nuclear power plant aging. Since then, this program has collected a significant amount of information, largely qualitative, on plant aging and its potential effects on plant safety. However, this body of knowledge has not yet been integrated into formalisms that can be used effectively and systematically to assess plant risk resulting from aging, although models for assessing the effect of increasing failure rates on core damage frequency have been proposed.
The purpose of this review is to survey the work conducted to address the aging of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) of nuclear power plants (NPPs), as well as the associated data bases. The review takes a critical look at the need to revise probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) so that they will include the contribution to risk from plant aging, the adequacy of existing methods for evaluating this contribution, and the adequacy of the data that have been used in these evaluation methods. A preliminary framework is identified for integrating the aging of SSCs into the PRA, including the identification of needed data for such an integration.
The major findings of this review are as follows.
• The issue of aging in NPPs cannot be addressed by models that are based solely on the current PRA structure and failure rates, such as the proposed plant-level and component-level models [NUREG/CR-5510 (Vesely, 1990) and NUREG/CR-4769 (Vesely, 1987) ]. SSCs that the basic PRA model neglects as having very small *This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, the whole process of formal evaluation should be documented carefully. The qualitative reasoning process in support of the expert judgment constitutes an important portion of the elicitation process andalso should be documented in detail.
Operating experience can provide two types of information: actual occurrences of failures caused by aging and evidence or direct observation of component degradation as a result of aging. Sources of operati.-.,gexperience include d,_tafrom the In-Plant Reliability Data System (IPRDS) sponsored by the NRC, the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data 3ystem (NPRDS) managed by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation, the Licensee Event Reports (LERs), plant maintenance records, in-service inspection reports and Nuclear Plant Experience (NPE) reports. Among these data sources, LER and NPRDS are the two most frequently used for aging analyses. The NPE data base is similar to that of the LER, whereas the IPRDS data base is very limited and incomplete.
When using generic data bases (such as NPRDS) in aging-risk analysis, one should be aware that they do not often contain information that is detailed and complete enough for drawing general conclusions. Events that are not of direct interest to the reporters are often overlooked or, at most, are roughly documented. The contents of the reports are often not detailed enough to allow aging-related root cause to be distinguished from other causes.
Plant-specific data generally contain more detailed informationon the operational and failure history of specific systems andcomponents. However, the major limitationof using plant-specific data in aging-risk analysis is that the number of incidents is often too small to reach a meaningful statistical conclusion, especially for plants that have only been in operation for a few years.
This situation could be improved by emphasizing the root-cause analysis in the existing data bases (such as LER or NPRDS). In particular,guidelines should be provided to the plant personnel regardingthe reportingof aging-relatedequipment failures.
The results of plant-specific PRAs and IPEs can be useful for identifying components significantly affected by aging that arc significant to plant safety. A recent stua_,by Vesely (1992) on the prioritization of aging contributors and the evaluation of maintenance effectiveness is an example of such a use. As most PRAs and IPEsdo not include passive components in their plant models, these would not be identified as risk-significant if the models were based on these data sources alone, even though some of these components might contribute significantly to aging risk. Consequently, it is importantto note that the decisions made in the screening analysis should be based on sources broaderthan the PRA and IPE results.
Also, an assessment of the availability and adequacy of the data needed for the development of models for the aging mechanisms (the second part of the framework) is ' conducted. Physical probabilisticmodels for estimating aging effects on component failure rates often require a large amount of data related to material properties and operating conditions. In the review of degradationniechanisms and associaw:l models, a wide range of data sources is identified. For the aging mechanisms of fatigue and irradiation emb.,'ittlement,it is found that there is a wide availability of data related to the material properties associated with the physical modeling of these aging mechanisms. However, much of these data arepre:,_nted in a conservative_ deterministic framework, and it may be necessary to recast m,xchof it in a statistical format so that probabilistic evaluations of the aging mechanisms can be performed.
For fatigue, there are a couple of areas for whicb the available data may not be appropriate for component and plant-specific reliability analyses. Special care should be taken when selecting crack-growth data, which can be affected by environmental effects such as corrosion. Therefore, the environmental conditions under whicb a component i_, operating should be assessed to determine whether the available crack-l_rowth data are applicable and, if not, further research may be necessary to provide data that is appropriate. Also, more crack-growth data in the oltra-low growtb-r_te regime below 10-6 mm/cycle, _pproaching the so-called fatigue threshold, may be needed because fatig,.w lifetimes tot some components can be dominated by crack extension in this region.
With respect to radiation embrittlement, it appears that, for most plants, the surveillance program provides an adequate supply of raw data to characterize the fracture mechanics parameters for a plant-specific vessel reliability study. However, for' a probabilistic treatment of irradiation embrittlement, it may be necessary to convert the fracturetoughness data base into corresponding statistical data for stress intensity factors. Other areas of concern include the characterization of an initial flaw distribution and the extrapolation of neutron exposure data from the surveillance capsule locations to the vessel wall. Flaw distributions that are used in the probabilistic fracture mechanical (PFM) analysis portion of a pressurized therraal shock (PTS) risk assessment can affect the overall results by several orders of magnitude, _nd thus, care must be taken to use a technically appropriate flaw distribution when dealing with an integrity assessment of vessels with low uppershelf toughness I_ehavior.
Stress-corrosion cracking and "rosion/corrosion are two damage mechanisms much less quantified and analyzed than fatigue and embrittlement. Pata and models related to stress-corrosion cracking and erosion/corrosion are mainly of fundamental, rather than engineering, value, and thus, it is concluded th,;. both data collection and modeling research are needed before reliability analyses of components affected by these mechanisms can be conducted. failure probabilities and the principal degradation mechanisms, e.g., fatigue, embrittlement, and erosion-corrosion, must be considered.
• Probabilistic models for degradationmechanisms would allow the effective use of information regarding the aging of SSCs, which is similar to that collected by the NPAR program. Failure-rate-based models cannot accommodate this type of information, which typically does not include significant numbers of failures.
• Probabilistic models for the degradation mechanisms also would allow effective risk management strategies to be developed. For example, in probabili:iticmodels for fatigue, the crack nondetection probability is an important input; the effect of taking steps to improve this probability could never be assessed in the context of failure-rate models.°T he development of a methodology that includes aging mechanisms can build on existing PRA models, appropriately modified, as current external-event analyses do.
Current PRA practice is reviewed to identify the underlying assumptions of plant modeling and data treatment methods. This review considers PRA plant and system modeling, event-tree and fault-tree modeling and the underlying hypotheses and estimation techniques and the underlying assumptions of component failure probability. Based on this , review, the PRA models and assumptions that need to be reassessed when aging effects may be present can be summarized follows.
1. As a general practice, event-tree and fault-tree analyses of current PRAs do not include passive SSCs (e.g., numerous valve bodies, cables, reactor vessel supports, containment, piping, and the reactor vessel). The argument for doing so is that the failure rates for the passive SSCs are negligibly small. Although this argument may be reasonable when SSCs are new, a critical evaluation of this assumption is needed when the subjects of the investigation are older. 2. The traditional PRA approach assumes a constant rate for each component failure mode, neglecting the possible effect of aging.
3. Except for the failure rates of identical components that have been covered by common-cause failure analyses and by complete state-of-knowledge correlation, the current PRA methodology does not model other kind of dependencies. Aging may introduce additional correlations of failure rates even among dissimilar components. 4. Failure probabilities of events other than hardware failures (e.g., pre-accident and post-accident human error rates, component unavailability because of testing and maintenance, etc.) could be different for older plants from those for new plants.
The current PRA methodology does not make such a distinction, and this should be investigated further. 5. External-event analyses need to be revisited. For example, aging may cause a shift in seismic fragility curves and the degradation of fire barriers.
The models and methods that are used to estimate the reliability of components and systems that are subject to age-related degradation are reviewed; the linearly increasing failure-rate model (Vesely, 1987 ) is the primary model reviewed. The principal question that is addressed is "Under what conditions, or in what time interval of an aging component's life, a failure distribution derived from a detailed physical models leads to a failure rate that can be approximated reasonably by a linearly increasing function?" To answer this question, we examine several models that have been p_opused for three important degradation mechanisms (fatigue, radiation embrittlement, and stress-corrosion cracking). Each model is discussed and presented in terms of its objectives and its formulation. The assumptions made in the model formulation are presented, as is a commentary on whether these assumptions can be considered valid under general conditions and, if they are not, under which specific condition they still may be valid.
This review concludes that a linearly increasing failure rate model would not generally and u,conditionally be appliCable to many aging-related degradation mechanisms. Even in the case where the damage accumulates linearly with time, the derived failure rate is, in general, a complicated function of time rather than a simple linear function. Further detailed modeling of the specific damage-accumulation mechanisms, as well as the
The currently available information is not sufficient for us to determine whether the linear model is a reasonable approximation in the life-time phase of interest for nuclear plant aging, For fatigue in particular, it is shown that, even though the damage accumulation resulting from fatigue may be (and commonly is in design applications) modeled as approximately linear, this model of linearly accumulated damage does not necessarily lead to a linearly increasing failure rate.
A major drawback of directly assuming a form for the failure rate (linear or not), rather than starting from the formulation of physical models for the degradation mechanisms, is that the underlying physical phenomena and parameters are not even identified in the analysis. This masking of the physics of the problem can affect aging risk management significantly. For example, working only with failure rates does not allow one to evaluate and understand the effect of an improved crack-detection probability on the reliability of a pipe. The proper way to do this would be to work with physical models that deal explicitly with crack growth.
The major advantage of the linear failure rate model is its simplicity and ease of application. If it could be demonstrated that this model is a reasonable approximation to the reliability of components experiencing age-related degradation, then it would be a very attractive choice. However, as stated earlier, for most of the degradation mechanisms of interest in nuclear plants, the true range of validity of the model has yet to be determined. Beyond the issue of the model validity in providing a means of estimating reliability and risk, a limitation would still remain in the model's inability to provide estimates of the effect of specific aging-management strategies on the probability of failure of components subject to aging mechanisms of a known physical nature.
The plant-level risk model proposed by Vesely in 1990 and 1992 uses Taylor-series expansions to incorporate aging effects into PRA. This model relates the change in individual component unavailabilities because of aging to the change in the overall plant risk (usually the core-damage frequency) through a Taylor-series expansion of the basic PRA model that calculates this risk from component unavailabilities. The results of the analysis are used to evaluate the effectiveness of maintenance and surveillance in controlling aging and to direct resources to those SSCs that are most important to NPP risk. Our review of this model has led to the following observations. 1. Aging may increase the importance of factors that had been judged as negligible or had not been accounted for in the basic plant-risk model. Most important in this regard is the possible increase in the failure probabilities of major passive components, such as the reactor pressure vessel and the reactor coolant piping, and of passive elements of active components, such as pump casings and valve seats.. 2. Even though the model is presented in terms of changes in component unavailabilities, the only contribution to the unavailabilities currently considered is that resulting from changes in the failure rates. In fact, expressing the model in terms of changes in failure rates would be more appropriate because various contributions to unavailability, e.g., that due to testing, would be explicitly included. In general, the failure rate would appear in several of these terms. 3. Considering the effect of aging on risk through component unavailability is too restrictive because there are situations in which factors other than component unavailability may contribute to risk. For example, aging components (such as batteries) may reduce the avaiiabie time for operator action during accidents, t,hias altering the probability of successful operator actions. More generally, any contributions that are analyzed based on the physics of the situation cannot be placed in this formalism. This includes seismic and fire analysis and Level 2 phenomena. 4. The restriction to component unavailabilities and failure rates masks the physics behind the various contributors to risk, thus inhibiting risk management.
It should be noted that, notwithstanding the above observations, the idea of building on the existing PRA model to assess the effect of aging on plant risk is a good one and should be preserved as much as possible.
The data used in NPP aging analyses are reviewed. The data used in the NPAR program include generic and plant-specific operating experience, plant documents, test and research results, and expert judgments. The most extens!ve data base used in aging-risk analyses is the TIRGALEX (Technical Integration Review Group for Aging and Life Extension) data base, which was developed at a workshop held in May 1987 (Levy et al., 1988) . This data base, which was used in studies by Vesely et al. (1990 and 1992) under the NPAR program, provides the input necessary to evaluate (1) the risk significance of component aging (RSCA) and, hence, a component contribution to plant risk because of aging; (2) the zisk significance of component aging and aging management practices (RSCAAMP); and (3) the effectiveness of current management practices of the industry for maintaining an acceptable level of plant risk in the presence of aging components. The overall objective of the TIRGALEX program was to set priorities for the aging evaluation of structures and components. Based on our review, we have the following observations. 1. The TIRGALEX database was intended to provide more of a relative ranking of the aging features of the various equipment categories than absolute numerical values for aging of such SSCs. However, these numerical values are used extensively as they are an essential input in the linear-failure-rate model 2. The data base is the result of unstructured expert-opinion elicitation procedures and, as such, is subject to the well-known location and variability biases (in other words, the values reported may be widely off the mark). Uncertainty ranges are not reported. 3. The data base is intended to be used as a generic data base that reflects industrial experience. However, in many cases, the TIRGALEX expert panel has based its judgment on a few plant-specific studies. Moreover, all numbers in the data base are assigned without statements on uncertainty, which may raise further concerns regarding the validity of its use for generic purposes, 4. Although test intervals, as well as inspection and repair probabilities, depend on the specific aging mechanism at work, no specific mechanisms are considered. This comment is related to our earlier observation, namely, that the use of failure rates alone masks the physics behind the various contributors to risk, thus inhibiting risk management.
The use of genetic operating experience for identifying aging mechanisms also is reviewed. There are four principal conclusions.
1. No single data source (such as LER, NPRDS, IEEE-Std.500) provides the necessary information to perform a thorough analysis of component aging. 2. Although a combination of various sources may allow a qualitative evaluation of the failure modes, causes, and aging mechanisms, it is difficult to reach any quantitative conclusions. 3. In many cases, additional difficulties in the data analyses have been introduced because some vendors, utilities, and manufacturers have been reluctant to provide the necessary information. _ 4. Data from operating experience are not sufficient, in quantity or quality, for validating any of the proposed aging models (linear, exponential, or Weibull) , and the uncertainties in the estimate of failure rates, and especially in the rate-ofchange of failure rates, remain high.
Very few analyses of plant-specific aging data nave been conducted. One such analysis has been conducted by PLG Inc. to evaluate aging trends in equipment failure rates, maintenance rates, and maintenance duration. Data from maintenance records of two systems of a boiling water reactor (BWR) plant with 17 yr of operating experience shows some interesting results (Bier et al., 1991) . Although there is a slight tendency toward an increase in failure rates for some components, there is also a slight tendency toward a decrease in failure rates for some others. These rather ambiguous messages regarding the trend of component failure rates with time support our thesis that there is a need for deeper investigation of the underlying degradation mechanisms.
The existing physical models for aging mechanisms of passive components and the available data that pertain to these models also are studied. In general, the data required for reliability physics based models of p, assive components consists of material properties and component stressors. The availabtlity and quality of such data vary, depending on the particular component and/or mechanism being studied, However, for actual SSCs of mterest in NPPs, almost no relevant data exist except for piping and pressure vessels.
Our review indicates that, with respect to aging mechanisms, there is a large amount of information available in qualitative form that comes from operating experience. This information is particularly important for passive components, where few actual failures have been observed, although degradation related to aging has been observed (Shah et al., 1987) . However, the immediate usefulness of this information in terms of quantitative measures of reliability and risk is limited because this information is qualitative in nature. Nevertheless, it is valuable because it provides insights about which aging mechanisms are affecting which SSCs and the relative importance of these mechanisms.
Based on the observations we have made on aging-related issues, we conclude that to adequately address th6 overall risk at an aging plant, current PRA methodology needs to be extended. This extension would be accomplished most expediently if the effect of aging on plant risk were assessed within a framework that was built on existing PRA models. Such a framework in which the effect of aging on plant risk would be analyzed in a separate section of the PRA. This method of treating aging mechanisms "externally" is similar to that for other external hazards (e.g., seismic events, fires, and floods). This framework, shown in Fig. 1 , consists of three major parts: the selection of aging components and mechanisms, the physical modeling of selected components and mechanisms, and the integration of the findings from the first two parts into the PRA.
The analysis starts with the selection of a set of aging SSCs and degradation mechanisms that are significant to plant safety. It is necessary to limit the scope of the analysis to a manageable size because physical models, such as those of probabilistic structural mechanics, involve complicated formalisms and require detailed information. A large number of components would render such an evaluation approach ineffective. Technical bases for the screening process include engineering judgment, operating experience, and risk-significance analysis. This part of the analysis yields a selected set of components and mechanisms for further investigation.
The second part of the framework deals with developing physical models for estimating the failure probabilities of the selected components and mechanisms. Several such models could be suitable for our purposes (perhaps after suitable simplification), e.g., the software package PRAISE developed for the evaluation of failure probabilities resulting from component fatigue. For other aging mechanisms, such as erosion/corrosion, more work is needed to develop physical models more suited to reliability analysis. As shown in Fig. 1 , the inspection, test, and maintenance practices at specific plants directly affect the time-dependent component failure rates. These practices and their effect should be modeled explicitly in the analysis.
The third part of the proposed framework integrates plant aging into the existing PRAs. Based on the findings from the screening analysis and the physical models, the initiating events, event trees, and fault trees in the PRAs will be reviewed and updated. The modification of PRAs may include the addition of basic events to fault trees and/or constructing new event trees and fault trees. This proposed framework retains most of the basic structure of current PRA models.
The availability and adequacy of the data required for the proposed framework for aging-risk analysis are examined. Data sources that can be used in the process of selecting aging components and mechanisms (the first part of the framework) include expert judgment, operating experience, and the results of existing PRA and IPE studies.
A future TIRGALEX-like e;:pert panel and workshop a!so could he osefol in conducting the screening analysis. A formal evaluation of expert judgment should include structured procedures in the following areas.
1. The selection of SSC aging-related issues about which the experts will be queried. 2. The identification and selection of experts. 3. The design and execution of the elicitation. 4. The treatment of biases of experts and biases induced during the elicitation process. 5. The dependency among experts. 6. The algorithms for aggregating expert judgments. 7. The treatment of uncertainty.
